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Brain Drain in Globalization: A General Equilibrium 
Analysis from the Sending Countries’ Perspective 
 
The paper assesses the global effects of brain drain on developing economies and quantifies 
the relative sizes of various static and dynamic impacts. By constructing a unified generic 
framework characterized by overlapping-generations dynamics and calibrated to real data, 
this study incorporates many direct impacts of brain drain whose interactions, along with 
other indirect effects, are endogenously and dynamically generated. Our findings suggest 
that the short-run impact of brain drain on resident human capital is extremely crucial, as it 
does not only determine the number of skilled workers available to domestic production, but it 
also affects the sending economy’s capacity to innovate or to adopt modern technologies. 
The latter impact plays an important role particularly in a globalized economy where capital 
investments are made in places with higher production efficiencies ceteris paribus. Hence, in 
spite of several empirically documented positive feedback effects, those countries with high 
skilled emigration rates are the most candid victims to brain drain since they are least likely to 
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 1. Introduction
Is brain drain a curse or a boon for the sending countries? In the sur-
vey by Commander et al. (2004), while diﬀerent forces at work are discussed
and several possible positive and negative eﬀects of skilled emigration are
reviewed, they conclude by suggesting that “much more research is needed
to pin down the relevant magnitudes.” In order to study the global eﬀects
of brain drain on developing economies and to quantify the relative sizes
of various static and dynamic impacts, a generic framework is certainly re-
quired, which is capable of incorporating the main mechanisms identiﬁed
in the existing literature. With this aim, we develop a ten-region general
equilibrium model characterized by overlapping-generations (OLG) dynam-
ics and calibrated with real data. We assess the impacts of skill outﬂow
using three economic indicators: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita,
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, and the skilled-to-less-skilled in-
come inequality. In such a framework, not only can we juxtapose the di-
rect impacts of brain drain, but their interactions and other indirect eﬀects
are also endogenously and dynamically generated. This is a very important
step forward, as skilled emigration is not an isolated incident, but it ripples
through the entire global economic system.
In the process of economic globalization, international movement of pro-
duction factors is an essential component that stimulates further integration
of the world economy. On the one hand, ﬁnancial liberalization and the
practice of international arbitrage contribute to large cross-border ﬂows of
capital. While the amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) at the world
level has increased from 13,346 millions in 1970 to 1,833,324 millions in 2007
(measured in US$ at current prices), the rise in FDI per capita is far more
remarkable in the developed economies alias “North”, than in the developing
economies alias “South” (see Figure 1). This North-South disparity reﬂects
largely the wide gaps in terms of total factor productivity, and not insigniﬁ-
cantly, the higher risks involved in investing in many developing countries.1
Similarly, international wage gaps are the most important pull factor that
lures economic migrants from the developing to the developed economies
(Clemens and Pritchett, 2008; Grogger and Hanson, 2008). The immigration
rate in high-income countries has tripled since 1960 and doubled since 1985.
1See, for example, the Country Risk Classiﬁcation produced by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
2Moreover, Docquier et al. (2009) document that, in OECD countries, two
thirds of the increase in immigration stocks during the 1990s are accounted
for by the South-to-North movement. When skill heterogeneity is taken into
account, it is found that the number of highly educated immigrants has
increased by 70 percent, whereas the corresponding ﬁgure for immigrants
with lower educational attainments is a dwarfed 30 percent. Although this
diﬀerence does not necessarily imply an increasing trend of brain drain,2
stylized facts show that there does exist strong positive selection of emigrants,
especially in the lower income countries (see Figure 2). In many developing
countries, brain drain rates are well above 40 percent, particularly for sub-
Saharan African countries, Central American countries, and small states.3
This positive selection may originate from either self-selection into em-
igration or from the destination country’s immigration policy. As shown
by Grogger and Hanson (2008), the larger international wage diﬀerences for
skilled than for less-skilled workers are consistent with positive self-selection.
Moreover, in poorer countries, this pattern can be further reinforced when
credit constraints are binding and less-skilled potential migrants cannot af-
ford migration costs (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005). On the other hand, ad-
mission criterion adopted by major labor-receiving countries have grown pro-
gressively skilled-biased.4 This raises the probability to migrate for highly-
educated young workers, while restrictions imposed on immigration of the
less-skilled are generally not relaxed, if not increased. Despite that trade bar-
riers have been greatly reduced and capital markets liberalized, the national
barriers to immigration remain substantial; consequently, notwithstanding
the rise in immigration rates, people ﬂows in globalization are much less
2In fact, Defoort (2008) demonstrates that brain drain rates, measured as the emigra-
tion rates of the skilled natives, were relatively stable over time. This may be due to
the general rise in educational attainments in developing countries; thus, increases in the
number of skilled emigrants are accompanied by a more educated population at origin.
3The skilled emigration rate exceeds 70 percent in a dozen countries.
4Put aside the traditional emphasis on family reunion, immigration policy-setting has
grown more skilled-biased in the major immigrant receiving countries. In 1967, Canada
adopts the point system that favors highly educated and highly skilled young individuals.
Australia followed suit in 1989, then New Zealand in 1991. In 2006, a detailed plan was
presented in the British Parliament on how to implement a points-based immigration
system. In the United States, the immigration reform bill of 2007, although failed, also
includes a similarly merit-based system. In the same year, the European Commission
announced her ”Blue Card” scheme in the hope of luring more skilled migrants.
3in extent when compared to other international ﬂows of factors and goods
(Freeman, 2006).
Although the debate over open/close border to immigration have so far
remained mainly in the political and philosophical domains,5 the economic
literature of brain drain has already gained major attention back in the
1970s. This can be attributed to the pioneering works of Bhagwati (1972,
1976a,b), where the well-known “Bhagwati Tax” was proposed and aimed
to compensate for the loss incurred by skill outﬂow in the developing coun-
tries. However, in Bhagwati and Hamada (1974, 1975), this loss is predicted
in a partial equilibrium framework characterized by wage rigidity, unem-
ployment, and ﬁscal costs, with brain drain worsening wage distortions and
accentuating ﬁscal externality, yet generating few potentially counteracting
eﬀects. Moreover, as skilled labor serves as a pivotal engine of growth, mod-
ern theories of brain drain based on endogenous growth models also predict
pessimistic outcomes, due to externalities related to human capital forma-
tion (Miyagiwa, 1991; Haque and Kim, 1995; Wong and Yip, 1999). On
top of these theoretical adverse eﬀects, emigration in general implies loss of
working-age population in the sending countries. This may pose as a serious
threat to those developing economies with high emigration rates as well as
a substantial degree of population aging, most notably the Eastern Europe
countries.6
Recent developments in the migration literature, however, have identiﬁed
a series of positive feedback eﬀects. Starting from Stark et al. (1997, 1998),
it is demonstrated that increased migration prospects for the skilled could
stimulate more human capital formation, thanks to higher expected returns
to education; thus, in countries with low skilled-emigration rates, their ex-
post human capital stocks increase as a result.7 Furthermore, diaspora at the
destination countries may reduce information-related investment risks and
is shown to spur FDI at the origin countries (Kugler and Rapoport, 2007;
5There are some economic studies discussing the issue of migration barriers and their
welfare costs, see for example, Freeman (2006) and Clemens and Pritchett (2008).
6In less developed regions, the average share of population aged 65 or over is expected
to rise from 5.0 % in 2000 to 14.6 % in 2050; however, when Eastern Europe is considered
alone, the rise goes from 12.9 % in 2000 to 25.4 % in 2050 (see the United Nations’ (U.N.)
World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision).
7See Mountford (1997), Vidal (1998), Stark and Wang (2002), Stark (2004), and the
empirical evidence in Beine et al. (2001, 2008a).
4Docquier and Lodigiani, 2009). Through immigrants’ ties with their home
countries, diaspora may also lower transaction costs, and empirical evidence
suggests that it encourages bilateral trade ﬂows (Gould, 1994; Head and
Ries, 1998). While the aforementioned network externalities are not speciﬁc
to more educated migrants, skilled diaspora nevertheless plays a unique role
in promoting international technology diﬀusion, which raises the total factor
productivity in immigrants’ home countries (Kerr, 2008; Lodigiani, 2008).8
Arguably, the list of potentially positive eﬀects of diaspora may also include
transferring of norms, which could alter fertility behavior (Beine et al., 2008b)
or bring about institutional reforms (Spilimbergo, 2009),9 and thus indirectly
enhancing economic development at the origin.
From the above, it is apparent that international ﬂows of factors and
goods/services are not independent of one another, as already demonstrated
in the traditional trade theory. However, their inter-dependencies are not
unambiguous. For example, static trade models predict that, a change in
factor endowment diﬀerential, due to an exogenous reallocation of labor to
the North from the South, must raise returns to capital at the destination
and induce capital outﬂow from the origin. In the meantime, the aforemen-
tioned evidence on network externalities indicate that emigration and FDI in-
ﬂows may well act as complements, especially from a dynamic perspective;10
moreover, technology diﬀusion can also augment the marginal productivity
of capital in the South and attract more capital investments. Last but not
8Kerr (2008) ﬁnds that, how technology diﬀusion spurs output growth diﬀers with
the home country’s development level. In less developed countries, this positive eﬀect
is more likely to transmit through the reallocation of labor from the agricultural to the
manufacturing sector. However, this paper does not distinguish diﬀerent sectors due to the
already complex setting of our dynamic model. For the same reason, we do not take into
account another possible complementary link between skilled emigration and FDI inﬂows
put forward by Ivlevs and de Melo (2008). They suggest that, when the non-trading sector
is more skill intensive than the production of traded goods, brain drain raises the price of
non-traded goods and leads to capital inﬂow to this very sector.
9Notice that Spilimbergo (2009) does not exactly study the diaspora eﬀect on institu-
tional reforms. Alternatively but relatedly, he studies whether foreign educated individuals
play a role in promoting democracy in their home country, and he ﬁnds a positive impact
if foreign education is acquired in democratic countries.
10For instance, Kugler and Rapoport (2007) observes dynamic complementarity but
contemporaneous substitutability between emigration and FDI inﬂows. While the for-
mer suggests the existence of network externalities, the latter is consistent with factor
reallocation in the trade models.
5the least, the oﬃcially recorded amount of remittances has been increasing
at a fast rate,11 suggesting yet another complementary and important link
between labor emigration and capital inﬂows (Walmsley and Winters, 2005),
and it further promotes economic growth in the relatively capital-scarce de-
veloping countries, particularly those with less developed ﬁnancial systems
(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2008).
In order to assess the global eﬀects of South-to-North brain drain on the
sending economies, this paper utilizes a calibrated OLG model, which divides
the world into three developed and seven developing regions. In each decade
from 2010-20 to 2050-60, we increase by 20 percent the forecast ﬂow of skilled
migrants from every developing region to each developed region. Increases in
skilled immigration in the North may be owed to either an enlarging inter-
national gap of skilled wage, or to an increasingly skilled-biased immigration
policy in response to aging, occupational shortage, and so forth. However, in
order to maintain tractability in the already complex setting, these decennial
20-percent increases are treated as exogenous shocks. Moreover, whereas our
generic framework is capable of incorporating many of the potential eﬀects of
brain drain reported in the existing literature, some of them are not included
due to compatibility issues (e.g., increasing bilateral trade ﬂows, transferring
of norms, etc.).
Despite the constraints, the greatest advantage of our uniﬁed generic
framework is that it allows for the interactions between diﬀerent forces at
work. This is especially important in a globalized economy, where interna-
tional ﬂows of people are often accompanied by international ﬂows of other
factors, as mentioned above. Moreover, the OLG framework makes it feasible
to take into account the impacts of brain drain through the age structure, and
it also allows for dynamic eﬀects via asset accumulation.12 In the simulations,
it is observed that the demographic shock of additional brain drain gener-
11In 2005, the oﬃcially recorded amount of remittances to developing countries exceeded
total development aid and equalized total FDI. It continued to grow at a double-digit rate
during 2005-2007, but slowed down in 2008, likely due to the global ﬁnancial crisis (see
the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects 2009).
12Docquier and Rapoport (2009) studies the overall costs and beneﬁts of brain drain on
the per country basis. However, in their partial equilibrium setting where all eﬀects occur
through the production parameters except labor endowment, all direct impacts of brain
drain are simulated outside the production equation. Hence, their study incorporates
neither the changes in international capital ﬂows, nor the impacts on the demographic
structure and the amounts of consumption/savings.
6ates multiple positive and negative impacts through four channels. First,
demographic changes in the age structure result in less working-age popula-
tion to support the retirees. Second, the incentive eﬀect on human capital
formation contribute to “brain gain” in regions where skilled emigration is
less prevalent. Third, technological progress is accelerated in technologi-
cally less-advanced regions, where the skilled diaspora plays an important
role in facilitating technology diﬀusion; on the other hand, however, the
loss of skilled human capital also breeds dynamic impacts that slow down
the catching-up of technology. Forth, an enlarged diaspora helps to reduce
information-related investment risks at origin, and thus attracting more FDI
inﬂows.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the winners and losers of brain drain can be
distinguished by the short-run impacts on their resident human capital, which
in turn aﬀects technological progress via a regions’ capacity to innovate or
to adopt modern technologies. Therefore, the loser regions are characterized
by high skilled emigration rates, which make them less likely to beneﬁt from
the “brain gain” eﬀect, and/or by relatively more advanced technology level,
with which technology diﬀusion generates less beneﬁts. Most importantly,
it is found that the reason why the impacts working through the technology
mechanism generates a large impact is greatly due to international capital
mobility, as production technology deﬁnes production eﬃciency, which is one
of the most important determinants of returns to physical capital. In other
words, the beneﬁts and the harms of brain drain can be ampliﬁed when it
takes place in globalization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the cali-
brated OLG model and describes the calibration methods. In Section 3, the
simulated results are summarized and followed by a detailed analysis, where
the dominant channels are identiﬁed through which brain drain impacts the
developing economies, and the conditions are explained under which each
channel generates positive or negative impacts. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. Model
We introduce international migration with skill heterogeneity into a gen-
eral equilibrium model with overlapping generations of individuals. The
model economy is composed of ten regions, similarly to the INGENUE model
7built by Aglietta et al. (2005).13 We distinguish three developed regions, or
the North, which includes
• North America (NAM),
• Japan (JAP), and
• other high-income advanced countries (ADV).
Seven developing regions, or the South, are grouped as follows:
• Eastern Europe (EAS),
• Middle East and Northern Africa (MEN),
• Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC),
• Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
• the Former Soviet Union (RUS),
• the Chinese world (CHI), and
• the Indian world and Paciﬁc Islands (IND).
Table 1 provides a glimpse at the regional characteristics of the South in
2000, which includes a region’s demographic share of the population aged 25
or over among all developing regions (Demog), then for each region itself,
the proportion of skilled in the resident population (Skill),14 the average em-
igration rate towards the OECD countries (Aemig), the skilled emigration
rate (Semig), the less-skilled emigration rate (Lemig), and the ratio of remit-
tances to GDP (Rem/Y).15 Each region exhibits a strong pattern of positive
selection into emigration, with the skilled emigration rate exceeds, in some
cases by more than 30 times, the less-skilled emigration rate. Moreover, in
certain regions such as SSA, the loss of human capital seems particularly
13The detailed list of countries by region can be found in Table A.1.
14Due to data availability, the skilled is deﬁned as those with post-secondary degrees.
15Regarding remittances, the amounts presented in Table 1 are taken from the IMF
database and are usually seen as underestimating the reality since many transfers are
channeled through the informal sector. It is a priori diﬃcult to estimate the region-
speciﬁc bias. Thus, we will only consider the oﬃcial IMF numbers in our analysis.
8Table 1: Regional characteristics in 2000 (in %)
Region Demog Skill Aemig Semig Lemig Rem/Y
EAS 3.9 12.4 6.6 11.8 5.3 1.3
MEN 6.2 8.5 3.5 8.5 2.8 2.8
LAC 10.2 11.8 4.3 11.0 3.1 2.0
SSA 9.7 2.8 0.8 12.9 0.4 2.6
RUS 3.0 18.9 2.0 2.6 1.8 0.6
CHI 36.6 3.8 0.5 7.3 0.2 0.8
IND 30.3 4.5 0.4 5.2 0.2 1.8
Total 100.0
Data source: Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
alarming given its low proportion of skilled population. Finally, the ratio of
remittances to GDP is small but non-negligible for all regions.
Our OLG model is dynamically calibrated so that it matches to a very
high degree the regional structures and the inter-regional disparities over the
period 1950-2000. It consists of two main blocks with a recursive structure.
To account for the empirical elasticities estimated in the literature, we build
an “upstream block”, calibrated outside the core of the model using data and
empirical studies. This block predicts the evolution of demographic variables,
human capital, and the magnitude of diaspora externalities. Then, these pre-
dictions are incorporated into a “micro-founded block” within a general equi-
librium framework. This block generates predictions for the world output,
prices, remittances, asset accumulation, the geographical allocation of assets,
the international ﬂows of capital income and other endogenous variables. In
order to assess the global eﬀects of brain drain on the developing economies,
demographic shocks of additional skilled emigration are introduced during
the period 2010-2050, and the analysis will focus on the transitional path
during the period 2000-2100.16
In the ensuing sections, we will describe the structure of the two main
building blocks and specify the demographic shock in the context of the model
economy. For clarity of the exposition, we will begin with the micro-founded
block.
16The model economy starts from an initial steady-state in 1870, and after demographic
shocks are introduced, the new steady state is reached in 2200.
92.1. The micro-founded block
Each region has three types of agents: households, the ﬁrm, and the gov-
ernment. Before depicting the behavior of each type of agents, it is essential
to discuss the demographic composition.
⊙ Demography: At each period, there are eight overlapping generations de-
noted by a, with a = 0 standing for the age class 15-24, a = 1 for 25-34, and
so on, up to a = 7 for 85-94. Individuals have uncertain longevities, meaning
that they may die at the end of every period. Each individual of the same
generation faces an identical cumulative survival probability, which decreases
with age. Hence, the size of each generation (Na,t+a) declines deterministi-
cally over time:
Na,t+a = Pa,t+aN0,t a = {0,1,...,7}, (1)
where Pa,t+a ∈ [0,1] is the exogenous fraction of generation a born at period
t alive at period t + a, with P0,t = 1.
The size of the young generation (a = 0) increases over time at an exoge-
nous growth rate:
N0,t = mt−1N0,t−1, (2)
where N0,t measures the initial size of the young generation, and mt−1 is one
plus the population growth rate, which includes both fertility and migration.
It is assumed that migration takes place at the ﬁrst period of life (i.e., a = 0)
and is permanent. This is a reasonable assumption since we focus on the
South-to-North migration of the skilled, who are likely to migrate, along
with their family members, on a more permanent basis.17
Individuals belonging to the same generation are heterogeneous in terms
of their skills. They are either skilled (denoted by s) or less-skilled (denoted
by l). It is assumed that an individual obtains post-secondary schooling and
becomes skilled before reaching age 25.18 Let φt stand for the proportion of
17This assumption is made also out of consideration for analytical tractability, so that
migrants and natives living in the same region have identical asset accumulations.
18Our perception of skilled versus less-skilled labor is similar to the one described in
Cervellati and Sunde (2005). Each individual is endowed with one unit of less-skilled
labor; however, it is transformed into a skilled unit upon the completion of post-secondary
education, when one has acquired the ability of abstract reasoning. This speciﬁcation is
consistent with empirical evidence showing perfect substitutability between high school
graduates and dropouts (Ottaviano and Peri, 2008; Card, 2009), and it also explains why
10the skilled among the young generation born at period t. The populations




0,t = (1 − φt)N0,t
, φt ∈ [0,1]. (3)
An exogenous proﬁle of participation in the labor market is assumed
per age and skill group (denoted by λ
j
a,t). Hence, labor supply of a type j










a,t j = {s,l}. (4)
Speciﬁcally, full participation is assumed except for the following three
groups. First, the skilled youth spend a fraction of their time in ob-
taining education and do not fully participate in the labor market (i.e.,
λs
0,t ∈]0,1[). Second, part of the population aged 55-64 are retired (i.e.,
λ
j
4,t ∈]0,1[, j = {s,l}). Lastly, all individuals aged above 65 are retired (i.e.,
λ
j
a,t = 0, ∀ a > 4, j = {s,l}).
⊙ Households: Each non-migrant individual derives utility from her lifetime




















a,t+a ≥ 0 denotes the amount of goods consumed by a non-migrant
individual of generation a at period t + a. The price of goods is normalized
to unity; therefore, c
j
a,t+a also equals to her total expenditures of the same
period.
However, migrants, i.e., those born in the South and living in the North,












j = {s,l}, (5)
the skilled diaspora is unique in facilitating technology diﬀusion (see Section 1).
11where γj ∈ [0,1] is a time-invariant and age-invariant propensity to remit.
It determines the share of total expenditures that a migrant of skill type j
sends home as remittances. This exogenous parameter is region-speciﬁc and
calibrated using the IMF recorded remittance receipts in 2003.19
Following de la Croix and Docquier (2007), we postulate the existence of
an insurance mechanism ` a la Arrow-Debreu. Each time after an individual
dies, her assets are equally distributed among individuals belonging to the
same generation living in the same region. Individuals thus maximize their
expected utility subject to a budget constraint requiring equality between
the discounted expected value of expenditures and the discounted expected
value of income, which consists of net labor income, pension beneﬁts, other
welfare transfers and/or net remittances. The household optimization prob-
lem determines the age proﬁles for consumption, remittances, savings, and
asset accumulation.
⊙ Firm: At each period and in each region, a representative and proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrm uses eﬃcient labor (Lt) and physical capital (Kt) to produce
a composite good (Yt).20 A Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed




1−α α ∈ [0,1], (6)
where At > 0 is an exogenous parameter representing the Harrod neutral
technological progress. α measures capital intensity of production, and under
the assumption of perfect competition with unity goods price, it also stands
for the share of gross capital returns in the total domestic product. It is as-
19Remittances are modelled in this way for the same reason explained in Footnote 17.
The age-invariance of the propensity to remit comes from our implicit assumption that
there is no remittances decay, due to scant empirical evidence.
20With our modeling of the production sector, we implicitly assumes that every region
produces homogeneous goods. They are traded freely, and the international goods market
is cleared by Walras’ law. Hence, a region either imports or exports and no bilateral trade
exists. Given our focus on factor ﬂows and their (real) prices, we choose this parsimonious
modeling of international trade. Furthermore, if the Hecksher-Ohlin type of assumptions
are satisﬁed, free trade would have led to factor price equalization even without factor
mobility. However, these assumption are not satisﬁed in our setting. As discussed later, the
ex-post gross returns to capital do not equalize because of region-speciﬁc risk premiums,
while cross-country diﬀerences in technology, along with capital endowment diﬀerentials,
contribute to international wage gaps.
12sumed that physical capital is mobile across regions; thus, the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital is equal to the international interest rates r∗
t augmented
by the region-speciﬁc risk premium (πt ≥ 0), which reﬂects investment risks:
r
∗






The total eﬃcient labor is a combination of skilled (Ls
t) and of less-skilled
labor (Ll








1/σ σ < 1, (8)
where υt is an exogenous skill-biased technical change, and σ ≡ 1−1/ǫ, with ǫ
denoting the elasticity of substitution between skilled and less-skilled labor.
The skilled and less-skilled wage rates (respectively ws
t and wl
t) are deter-















⊙ Government: The government levies taxes on labor earnings and on con-
sumption expenditures in order to ﬁnance general public consumption, pen-
sion beneﬁts and other welfare transfers. The government also issues bonds
and pays interests on public debt. In every developing region, the government
receives foreign development aid, and the amount of which is calibrated with
the OECD data of oﬃcial development assistance. The government budget
constraint is satisﬁed at each period by adjusting the wage tax rate.
The pension system is modeled in a way as to allow for diﬀerent pension
systems in each region. The regional pension systems are partly Bismarckian
(beneﬁts proportional to wages) and partly Beveridgian (lump-sum beneﬁts).
We use a region-speciﬁc parameter capturing the wage-related fraction of
beneﬁt. Public debt is computed from the World Bank’s World Development
Index (WDI), with the exceptions being the public debt in ADV and in JAP,
which are obtained from the OECD data on Gross Financial Liabilities.
⊙ Equilibrium: A competitive equilibrium of the open economy is charac-
terized by (i) households’ and the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions, (ii) market-
clearing conditions on the goods and labor markets, (iii) budget balance for
each regional government, (iv) the equality between the aggregate quantity
13of world assets and the quantity of the world capital stock plus the sum of
public debts of all regions, and ﬁnally (v) the international arbitrage condi-
tion of returns to capital. The equilibrium on the goods market is achieved
by Walras’ law.
2.2. The upstream block
In the upstream block, data are used to calibrate the baseline parameters
of the model economy. Moreover, elasticities estimated in empirical studies
are incorporated to predict the evolution of demographic variables, the eﬀect
of migration on human capital accumulation, and the magnitudes of diaspora
externalities.
⊙ Demographic parameters: The survival probability Pa,t+a in Eq. (1) and
the population growth rate mt in Eq. (2) are calibrated for the period 1950-
2050, using the U.N. World Population Prospects, the 2000 Revision. In
order to compute the skilled share of every generation, we use the Barro-Lee
Dataset (2001), which provides yearly by-country data on the educational
attainment of individuals aged 25-74 for the period 1950-2000.21 It is assumed
that the skilled share of the young generation, φt in Eq. (3), remains the
same from year 2000 onwards.
Our deﬁnition of migrants refers to foreign-born individuals living in the
destination regions. In order to calibrate the South-to-Northmigration stocks
and ﬂows at the baseline, we explicitly track migrants from the seven de-
veloping to the three developed regions.22 In other words, Our calibration
21We ﬁrstly aggregate this data set by region and then partition it to obtain shares of
skilled per age class. We proceed as follows. First, it is reasonable to assume that, at each
period, the share of skilled individuals is higher for the younger age class. In particular,
we assume that the share of skilled individuals aged 85 to 94 corresponds arbitrarily to
80% of the share of skilled aged 75 to 84, which in turn is equal to 80% of that of the next
younger age class, and so forth. As all the shares of skilled per age class then depend on
the share of skilled aged 25 to 34, we compute this share in order to matches the total
share of skilled in 1950, as given by the Barro-Lee Dataset. Second, we report the values
of the shares of the age classes 25-34 to 65-74 of the following years. For example, the
share of skilled aged 35 to 44 in 1960 is equal to the share of skilled aged 25-34 in 1950,
as we assume that the skilled and less-skilled individuals have the same probability to be
alive at the beginning of each period. Third, for all the following years, we compute the
share of skilled aged 25 to 34 in the same way as for the year 1950. Lastly, the share of
skilled aged 15 to 24 in 1950 is simply equal to the share of skilled aged 25 to 34 in 1960.
22North-to-North and South-to-South migrants are implicitly dealt with through the
U.N. population data and forecasts.
14strategy is based on the proportion of total immigrant stock to total resident
population observed in each of the three developed regions.
For year 2000, the number, the age structure, and the skill type (prox-
ied by educational attainment) of immigrants are calibrated using published
statistics in the U.N. and the Docquier-Marfouk (2006) datasets. From the
gross stock of immigrants in each developed region, we subtract migrants
aged 0-14 and all North-to-North migrants, then we compute the shares of
immigrants by skill and by region of origin. Anchored to the 2000 numbers,
we use survival probabilities as well as the growth rates of the immigrant
population to construct the retrospective numbers of migrants before 2000.
For immigration forecasts, we start from the 2000 numbers and let migrants
die according to the survival probability forecasts. Assuming that all future
migrants are aged 15-24, we let changes in the stock of immigrants follow the
U.N. forecasts (from which we subtract those aged 0-14 and North-to-North
migrants using the 2000 proportions). It is assumed that future migrants are
distributed by skill and by region as they are in 2000.
Naturally, demographic evolution aﬀects an economy’s support ratio,


















Figure 3.a depicts its baseline evolution. It is observed that all regions will be
aﬀected by the aging process, thus experiencing shrinking shares of working-
age population, with EAS facing the lowest support ratio and SSA the highest
at all periods. Except for SSA, the decline of support ratio levels oﬀ around
2050, and from then on, the share of working population actually begins to
climb up in some regions, most notably in EAS, RUS, and to a lesser degree
in CHI.
⊙ Brain drain versus brain gain: As mentioned in Section 1, a recent wave
of theoretical and empirical studies suggest that skilled emigration can gen-
erate a positive incentive eﬀect on human capital formation, which may out-
weigh the loss of human capital due to brain drain, especially in countries
with low skilled emigration rates. At the baseline, it is considered that the
23Notice that mt−1 in Eq. (2) already takes into account population changes due to
migration; therefore, Na,t measures the resident population of age class a at period t.
15net eﬀects of skilled emigration on human capital formation are already em-
bodied in the calibration based on real data. The resident human capital
















Figure 4.a depicts its baseline evolution by region.
In order to incorporate the “brain gain” eﬀect in computing the after-
shock levels, we follow Beine et al. (2008a), who ﬁnd evidence that the
prospect of skilled emigration is positively associated with gross (pre-
migration) human capital levels in cross-country regressions. To begin with,
we build on Docquier and Marfouk (2006)’s data and compute the relative
changes in skilled emigration rates (∆ms
t/ms
t) resulted from the rise in em-
igration ﬂows to the North. At the baseline, the gross human capital level
at period t, measured as the proportion of skilled among natives (including
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which is a transformation of Eq. (6) in Beine et al. (2008a), and ml
t de-
notes the less-skilled emigration rate. Then, we use the brain gain elasticity











to obtain the after-shock level of gross human capital, which is then trans-
formed back to the after-shock level of resident human capital.24
⊙ Propensity to remit: The calibration strategy for the propensity to remit,
or γj in Eq. (5), is based on the oﬃcially recorded remittances to GDP ratio
for each developing region (see Table 1). Due to data availability, we do
not have information on the potential heterogeneity in propensities to remit
24Notice that, given the framework of eight overlapping generations, the change in resi-
dent human capital at period t needs to be taken into account also in the next periods.
16between skill types.25 Neither do we know about the distributional pattern
of remittance receipts in migrants’ home country.26 It is assumed at the
baseline that γs = γl and that remittances are distributed equally among all
residents living in the same developing region.27
⊙ Production parameters: The share of gross capital returns in the total
domestic output, or α in Eq. (6), is set to one-third as estimated in the
growth accounting literature ` a la Solow (1957).
The Harrod neutral technological progress (At) is calibrated as follows.
North America is assumed to be the technologically leading economy at all
periods considered, with the level of technology denoted by A
NAM
t . Its evo-
lution is calibrated with real observations up to year 2000, and for future
periods, the annual growth rate is assumed to be equal to 1.84 percent. In
order to obtain At for non-leading regions, we use the observed paths of GDP
ratio, Yt/Y
NAM
t , where Y
NAM
t measures the leader’s GDP. We swap the exoge-
nous variable At/A
NAM
t for the endogenous variable Yt/Y
NAM
t and then solve
the identiﬁcation steps.28 The ratios of GDP’s are computed by employing
the WDI data of GDP per purchasing power parity for years 1980, 1990,
and 2000, and the values in 1980 are adopted for the periods preceding 1980.
For the periods following 2000, the calibration of the forecast technological
progress will be discussed later when changes in resident human capital and
25While Ratha (2003) claims that skilled migrants send more remittances due to higher
earnings, empirical evidence put forth by Faini (2007) and Nimii et al. (2008) suggest
that, compared to their less-skilled counterpart, skilled migrants have a lower propensity
to remit.
26On the one hand, some studies ﬁnd that remittances are distributed rather evenly
among diﬀerent income groups (e.g., Taylor and Wyatt, 1996) while others identify that
inequality is deepened with migration and remittances (e.g., Barham and Boucher, 1998).
On the other hand, the relationship between migration/remittances and inequality may
be characterized by an inverse U-shaped pattern, suggesting that the short- and long-run
eﬀects may be of opposite signs (Stark et al., 1986; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007; Shen
et al., 2009).
27Notice, however, when calibrated to the oﬃcial remittances data, it turned out to be
infeasible that skilled migrants could have a much lower propensity to remit. Otherwise,
remittances from less-skilled migrants will have to account for an unreasonably large share
of total remittance receipts, which would then require that they remit an extremely large
share of their total income.
28We follow the methodology developed in de la Croix and Docquier (2007). They use
a backsolving identiﬁcation method to calibrate total factor productivity (TFP) with the
Dynare algorithm (Juillard, 1996).
17technology diﬀusion are explicitly taken into account.29
Following Acemoglu (2002), the elasticity of substitution between skilled
and less-skilled labor (ǫ) is set to 1.4, so the corresponding parameter σ in
Eq. (8) is equal to 0.2857. Regarding the skill-biased technical change (υt),
the exogenous variable υt/(1 − υt) is swapped for the endogenous variable
ws
t/wl
t in Eq. (9) using the aforementioned procedure. Skill premiums in
2000 are arbitrarily ﬁxed for each region.30 For the periods preceding 2000,
the values vary according to the 1950-2000 pattern of college wage premiums
in the United States (Acemoglu, 2003). For the periods following 2000, the
values in 2000 are adopted.
⊙ Technological progress: In order to take into account the diaspora exter-
nality in enhancing technology diﬀusion from the North to the South (see
Section 1), we follow Lodigiani (2008), who extended Vandenbussche et al.
(2006) by adding skilled diaspora in their speciﬁcation that estimates TFP
growth fueled by a neo-Schumpeterian technological progress:31
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where TFPt ≡ A
1−α
t in Eq. (6), and (TFPt/TFP
NAM
t ) is a monotonic
transformation of a region’s distance to the technology frontier (At/A
NAM
t ).
∆ln(TFPt) denotes the rate of TFP growth between year t and year t + 5.
Ms
t is a developing region’s stock of skilled emigrants living in the North.32
Finally,  t captures the exogenous time trend. The basic idea lying behind
this speciﬁcation is that TFP growth is determined by a region’s capacity
29For ADV and JAP, the values in 2000 are adopted for all periods following 2000.
30The skill wage premiums in 2000 are: 2.35 for ADV, 3 for NAM, JAP, EAS, and MEN,
3.15 for LAC, 3.25 for RUS, CHI, and IND, and ﬁnally 3.5 for SSA.
31Using a similar framework, Papageorgiou and Spilimbergo (2009) identify that foreign-
educated students also facilitate technological diﬀusion back to their home countries.
32It is implicitly assumed that, as the skilled diaspora located in NAM, skilled emigrants
living in JAP and in ADV have the same externality in diﬀusing modern technologies. We
regard it as a safe assumption given their narrow technology gaps to NAM.
18to innovate or to adopt modern technologies. On the one hand, in a tech-
nologically less-advanced region that rely on the adoption of technologies
innovated in the North, skilled emigrants facilitate technology diﬀusion back
to the South; thus, it helps to augments TFP growth.33 On the other hand,
however, skilled human capital is crucial for technology innovation but also
for the adoption of technologies diﬀused from the North; therefore, brain
drain negatively aﬀects TFP growth, and this eﬀect is especially pessimistic
for regions far from the technological frontier because of its inability to in-
novate and lack of skilled workers to adopt modern technologies.
As mentioned earlier, changes in resident human capital and the dias-
pora externality in technology diﬀusion are explicitly taken into account for
the forecast of the Harrod neutral technological progress, i.e., from period
2000 onwards. The forecasts of migration and of resident human capital are
plugged into the above estimation in order to predict the evolution of TFPt,
which is then transformed into At; moreover, we consider that  t is equal to
zero everywhere except in EAS, CHI, and IND, where the exogenous trends




⊙ Risk premium: As discussed in Section 1, skilled diaspora may contribute
to reducing information-related risks for capital investments in the migrants’
home countries, and thus attracting more FDI inﬂows in the South. This





t−1, (1 + πt+1) = (1 + πt)  
￿








otherwise, πt+1 = πt . (11)
33Docquier and Rapoport (2009) point out that the log-speciﬁcation of diaspora exter-
nality in Lodigiani (2008) leads to counter-intuitive results that technology diﬀusion is
very strong in small countries. Our aggregate approach makes this misspeciﬁcation a very
minor problem when making cross-region comparisons; however, it may imply that the
positive eﬀect generated through technology diﬀusion is to some degree underestimated.
However, we choose to follow this speciﬁcation as it is the only existing empirical study
that is highly compatible with our model.
34Over the period 1950-2000, we calibrate µt so that the baseline simulations perfectly
match the observations of GDP ratios, Yt/Y
NAM
t . The calibrated path for µt is rather
stationary and distributed around zero in all regions except for EAS, CHI, and IND,





assumed to remain constant from 2000 onwards.
19−φ ≡ −θ(1−α)(FDIt/Kt) is the elasticity of risk premium to the lagged size
of skilled diaspora.35 θ is deﬁned and estimated in Docquier and Lodigiani









with fdit denoting FDI per worker, so θ is its elasticity to the lagged size of
skilled diaspora. (FDIt/Kt) is set to 12.5 percent, which is approximately
the average share of FDI among total investments in developing countries.
We anchor the evolution of risk premium to the 2000 values, which are
calibrated with the OECD’s Country Risk Classiﬁcation.36 For the periods
preceding 2000, the values in 2000 are adopted. For the periods following
2000, the migration forecast is plugged into Eq. (11) to obtain the evolution
of risk premium, which is then depicted in Figure 6.a.
2.3. The demographic shock of additional skilled emigration
Starting from the U.N. forecasts, in each decennial period from 2010-20 to
2050-60, the demographic shock constitutes a 20 percent increase in the fore-
cast ﬂow of skilled migrants from every developing region to each developed
region. Consistent with the model assumption, the additional migrants are
considered to belong to the age class a = 0, or aged 15-24.37 Notice, however,
it is implicitly assumed in our aggregate approach that all changes induced
by the ﬁve waves of emigration shocks are homogeneously experienced by
every country within the same region. Hence, the simulated changes per




36It is based on the Knaepen Package, a system for assessing country credit risk and
classiﬁes countries into eight country risk categories, from no risk (0) to high risk (7).
Basically, it measures the credit risk of a country. There are no risks for the three developed
regions whereas the risk classiﬁcations in 2000 for each of the seven developing regions are
as follows: 3.4 for EAS, 4.0 for MEN, 5.2 for LAC, 6.4 for SSA, 6.2 for RUS, 3.2 for
CHI, and 4.9 for IND. In order to transform these values into risk premiums, we use
the formula: π2000 = 0.37   (RC/7), where RC denotes a region’s risk classiﬁcation and
max(π2000) = 0.37 is based on the calibration to Caselli (2007), who ﬁnds that the average
returns to capital are about 1.25 times higher in developing than in developed economies,
after correction for price diﬀerences.
37A skilled young migrant is a young adult who is forecast to complete post-secondary
education, regardless of where the degree is awarded.
20developing region are in eﬀect more indicative of those experienced by large
countries, due to their heavier weight in the aggregation. Below, we discuss
how the demographic shock changes some key regional characteristics from
the baseline. We focus on the transitional period 2000-2100, or the period
before the ﬁrst wave of additional migrants is introduced until the period
when the additional migrants of the last wave are entirely retired.
Figure 3.b shows the relative changes in support ratio (SRt). As expected,
all regions are adversely aﬀected by the loss of working-age population caused
by the demographic shock that alters population dynamics via mt in Eq. (2).
However, EAS experiences the greatest impact due to the combination of a
relatively large share of aged (hence non-working-age) population and a high
skilled emigration rate among its rather educated populace. The impacts
reach their respective maxima in 2060, with EAS confronted by a decline of
0.65%.
Regarding resident human capital (HC RS
t ), Figure 4.b depicts its relative
changes. It is observed that, after the initial shocks, increased skill outﬂows
negatively aﬀect the skill composition among the young generation, or φt
in Eq. (3). Hence, resident human capital is decreased, in particular for
regions characterized by distinctively high skilled emigration rates, namely
EAS, LAC, and SSA (see Table 1). However, the incentive eﬀect of better
skilled migration prospects on human capital formation (or the brain gain
eﬀect) eventually beneﬁt all regions, enhancing resident human capital by
maximally 2-3%.38
As discussed earlier, resident human capital and skilled diaspora are cru-
cial determinants of technological progress (see Eq. (10)). Figure 5.b plots
the relative changes in the Harrod neutral technological progress with re-
spect to the leader’s (At/A
NAM
t ). Small positive eﬀects are observed in MEN
and IND, both with relatively low skilled emigration rates and located far
from the technology frontier. For them, the enlarged skilled diaspora in the
North acts to facilitate the diﬀusion of more advanced technology back to the
South. In comparison, the initial losses of resident human capital observed in
EAS, LAC, SSA, and CHI have negative dynamic impacts on their capacity
to innovate or to adopt modern technologies;39 meanwhile, the compensatory
38As our aggregate approach has the eﬀects in every region dominated by the large
countries, this result is consistent with Beine et al. (2008a)’s ﬁndings about winners and
losers of brain drain, where “the most populated countries [...] are all among the winners.”
39For CHI, its distance to the technological frontier is not low enough for it to beneﬁt
21role played by skilled diaspora in technology diﬀusion is of less importance
for technologically more advanced regions, e.g., EAS as well as CHI in the
second-half of the 21st century. Although larger than the positive eﬀects, the
negative relative changes still lie well below 1%.
Finally, Figure 6.b describes the relative changes in risk premium (πt)
on capital returns. It is found that, through the enlarged diaspora, all de-
veloping regions beneﬁt from reductions in risk premiums, which will then
imply ceteris paribus greater FDI inﬂows in the open economy. The relative
changes in 2060 range between 0.16-0.27%.
3. Results and Analysis
This section presents and analyzes the simulated results of the ten-region
calibrated OLG model, where all the mechanisms discussed in the previous
section are incorporated into a uniﬁed generic framework, with the direct
eﬀects of skilled emigration propagated and the indirect eﬀects endogenously
and dynamically generated. By introducing the demographic shock of addi-
tional South-to-Northbrain drain speciﬁed above, we would like to answer the
following questions: (i) What are the impacts on the developing economies
when they are faced with larger skill outﬂows? (ii) Which channels are more
dominant? Do they induce positive or negative impacts on the South, and
under which conditions? The assessment of the overall impacts is conducted
by comparing three economic indicators at the baseline and after shocks.
These indicators are deﬁned as follows:
• GDP per capita: Yt/Nt.
• GNI per capita: GNIt/Nt,
where GNIt = Yt + remittance receiptst + net capital income inﬂowst
much from the diaspora externality on technology diﬀusion, but it is suﬃciently low for it
to suﬀer greatly from the loss of skilled workers. This is why CHI’s technological progress
is so adversely aﬀected even though it faces only a slightly negative impact on resident
human capital after the ﬁrst wave of migration shock. Notice that CHI’s inability to
beneﬁt much from technology diﬀusion is rather at odds with Kerr (2008)’s ﬁnding that
China is the main beneﬁciary from the U.S. innovations. This may be again due to the
mis-speciﬁcation problem mentioned in Footnote 33 given that CHI has the largest skilled
diaspora at all periods along the transitional path.
22+ foreign aidt − consumption taxest.40





To begin with, we examine how the shock of additional skilled emigration
aﬀects GDP per capita through diﬀerent channels. As a matter of fact,
the total impact can be disentangled by the changes in the four regional
characteristics discussed in Section 2.3.
3.1. Disentangled eﬀects on GDP per capita
The disentangled eﬀects of the demographic shock on GDP per capita are
depicted in Figure 7 by each channel.
Demography (mt): The loss of working-age population accelerates the
aging process and results in a lower support ratio. In other words, with each
migration shock, it implies a downsized domestic production yet proportioned
by the same number of retirees. Hence, GDP per capita is negatively aﬀected
in all regions, with the maximal impacts reached in 2060 and ranged between
0.2-0.7%. Consistent with the impact on support ratio, EAS is the hardest
hit region through the demography channel.
Human Capital (φt): It is observed that the incentive eﬀect of brain
drain, which eventually contributes to “brain gain” in all regions via more
human capital formation, also improves GDP per capita. For most regions,
this positive impact begins to level oﬀ in 2060, with RUS beneﬁting the most
at 1.0% and SSA the least at 0.2%. In line with the relative changes in
resident human capital, the adverse short-run impacts are more severe in
regions characterized by high skilled emigration rates.42 In comparison, the
medium-to-long-run beneﬁts of the incentive eﬀect are most visible in regions
40Net capital income inﬂows are calculated as the value of residents’ assets subtracted
by the returns to capital used in domestic production.
41The deﬁnition of GNI
j
t , j = {s,l}, is analogous to GNIt, except that (residents’ labor
income
j
t + residents’ asset value
j
t) is used in place of Yt.
42In order to single out the impact of the incentive eﬀect, all parameter values are held
at the baseline, except φt. Because of the assumption outlined in Section 2 that the
skilled youth do not fully participate in the labor market, the initial increases in φt due to
migration shocks imply that there are less eﬃcient labor (Lt) available for production. This
is why even those regions characterized by low skilled emigration rates are also negatively
impacted in the beginning of the 21st century in Figure 7.b.
23where the labor force is better skilled, including EAS and LAC where the
negative short-run impacts are actually the greatest.
Technological progress (At): Since the Harrod neutral technological
progress has the multiplier eﬀect on domestic outputs (see Eq. (6)), its
impacts on GDP per capita naturally follow the pattern of relative changes
in technological progress discussed in Section 2.3, with MEN and IND see-
ing positive eﬀects up to 0.1% and 0.3% respectively thanks to technology
diﬀusion that increases the eﬃciency of the production factors. In the mean
time, those regions suﬀering initially from the loss of resident human capital
have to cope with long-lasting negative dynamic impacts on their capacities
to innovate or to adopt modern technologies; therefore, with the undermined
production eﬃciencies, returns to capital decline, which discourages capital
investments in these regions. LAC and CHI are most seriously aﬀected in this
respect, with their GDP per capita dwindled by about 0.9% maximally.43
Risk premium (πt): In an open economy, the level of risk premium is one
of the crucial factors that determine the volume of physical capital invested
in domestic production. As every region experiences reduced risk premium
with the enlargement of diaspora, they also enjoy increases in GDP per capita
through this channel. It is observed that the positive eﬀects impact nearly all
regions with similar magnitudes, ranging between 0.01-0.03% in 2060. EAS
beneﬁts slightly less because, under the migration shocks, its diaspora has
a smaller relative increase in size (see Eq. (11)). Note that this eﬀect is
rather small in the short-run; nonetheless, it grow larger with accumulative
migration shocks and its impacts are long-lasting.
Now that we have understood better the channels through which the
demographic shock of additional brain drain impacts GDP per capita. We
proceed further to the discussion of total impacts on the three economic
indicators.
3.2. Total impacts on GDP per capita
Figure 8.a presents the total impacts of the demographic shock on GDP
per capita. In the medium-to-long-run, it is found that all the seven de-
veloping regions either enjoy increased GDP per capita or face very slightly
43However, we believe that the total impact of brain drain on CHI through the technol-
ogy channel may be largely downward biased, due to the problem of mis-speciﬁcation in
the adopted empirical equation. See the discussion in Footnotes 33 and 39.
24negative impacts, thanks to the dynamic incentive eﬀect on human capital
formation and to the gradual reductions of risk premium. Nevertheless, while
some experience positive impacts already in the short-run (i.e., MEN, RUS,
IND, with 0.3-0.6% increases in 2060), others have to ﬁrst undergo long peri-
ods of economic downturn along the transitional path (i.e., EAS, LAC, SSA,
and CHI, with 0.4-0.7% decreases in 2060). Except for RUS, what distin-
guishes the winners from the losers in the shorter run is the impacts working
through the technology channel, which is closely related to a region’s resident
human capital and its distance to the technological frontier. It is observed
that all the loser regions suﬀer from the dynamic impacts on technological
progress originating from the initial losses of their resident human capital as
depicted in Figure 4.b. Besides CHI, all other loser regions have distinctively
high skilled emigration rates, which are also the characteristics of the regions
that are less likely to enjoy brain gain according to Beine et al. (2008a).
Hence, in Figure 8.b, we run an alternative simulation where we abstract
from the incentive eﬀect on human capital formation. The total impacts
are far more pessimistic, with all regions beneﬁt less/ suﬀer more from the
migration shocks (with 0.0-0.3% increases and 0.3-2.1% decreases in 2060).
In 2100, only MEN and IND remain as the beneﬁciaries in terms of GDP
per capita. Yet, the beneﬁts are to a much lesser extent and still owed
to technology diﬀusion through their enlarged skilled diaspora. In addition,
EAS, LAC, SSA, and CHI are now faced with non-negligibly negative impacts
even in the medium-to-long run, which range between 0.3-1.5% in 2100.
However, human capital, or labor inputs in general, is not the only factor
used in the production of goods, but physical capital also plays an indispens-
able role. As mentioned in Section 1, the traditional trade theory predicts
that in an open economy skill outﬂows are accompanied by capital ﬂight,
whereas the recent empirical literature suggests a dynamic complementary
link between migration and FDI inﬂows. Thus, it is important to gauge
the eﬀect that is attributed to international capital ﬂows, which respond en-
dogenously to the migration shocks and their direct impacts. In order to
achieve this aim, an alternative simulation is run with restricted ﬂows of
physical capital, which means that the demographic shock has no impacts on
the amount of physical capital available in each region nor on risk premiums
that are associated with FDI inﬂows.44 Figure 8.c presents the after-shock
44In other words, Kt and πt are held at the baseline levels.
25consequences under this scenario. The total impacts are now dictated by the
channels of demography and of human capital, which jointly determine the
total eﬃcient labor available for domestic production. Moreover, whether
positive or negative, the impacts become of smaller magnitudes, with EAS
being the salient loser in the shorter run mainly due to its large share of
senior residents.
It is worth being pointed out, however, that in this scenario the relative
changes in technological progress remain the same as calibrated before.45
Its loss of inﬂuence when capital ﬂows are restricted thus suggests that the
technology channel works mainly through changes in capital investments in
domestic production. Take LAC and CHI for example, the two regions most
adversely impacted in terms of relative changes in technological progress and
also the top two short-run losers in the usual calibration shown in Figure
8.a. It is found that, when capital ﬂows do not react to changes in inter-
regional diﬀerences in returns to capital caused by changes in production
eﬃciency, the negative impact on LAC’s GDP per capita is downsized from
0.7% to 0.1% in 2060, and for CHI, the negative impact of 0.7% is entirely
annulled. This alternative scenario teaches us a very important lesson, as it
indicates that studies of brain drain in globalization shall not merely look at
its direct implications on human capital and other economic determinants on
which human capital have causal eﬀects. As brain drain aﬀects the economic
environment in the South, other factor ﬂows will respond to these changes and
may act to magnify the total impacts of brain drain (e.g., through changes
in technological progress) or to alleviate the negative eﬀects (e.g., through
increased FDI inﬂows attracted by lower risk premiums).
Finally, given the recent evidence that the skilled may have lower propen-
sity to remit (see Section 2.2), another alternative simulation is conducted
assuming the shock of additional skilled emigration does not add to the
amount of remittance receipts. As shown in Figure 8.d, the total impacts
are very much identical to the results with the usual calibration.46 In other
words, in terms of domestic production in the developing regions, the im-
pacts of brain drain and its direct and indirect eﬀects are hardly altered by
remittance receipts. This is not a surprising outcome because: ﬁrst, not
45See Figure 5.b.
46In fact, the total impacts do become slightly more pessimistic when the additional
skilled emigrants send back no remittances, but the diﬀerences in magnitudes are nearly
undetectable.
26all remittances are invested in productive activities; second, capital mobility
implies that the remittance-funded investments do not necessarily take place
in the South, but conform to international arbitrage.
3.3. Total impacts on GNI per capita
The total impacts of the demographic shock on GNI per capita are de-
picted in Figure 9.a. Compared to the total impacts on GDP per capita, the
general picture is slightly more optimistic. While the short-run winners and
losers remain the same, the magnitudes of negative impacts are decreased
(from 0.4-0.7% to 0.1-0.5% in 2060) whereas the scale of positive impacts are
increased (from 0.3-0.6% to 0.6-0.8% in 2060). Recall the deﬁnition of GNI
that it comprises of domestic outputs, remittances receipts, residents’ foreign
assets, and so on. Hence, the similar patterns between the total impacts on
GNI per capita and on GDP per capita suggest that the dominant channels
remain the same as those dictate the impacts on domestic production, i.e.,
the major eﬀects work through changes in resident human capital and in
technological progress. This can be conﬁrmed by the results shown in the
two alternative simulations: one lacks the incentive eﬀect on human capi-
tal formation (see Figure 9.b) and the other has restricted ﬂows of physical
capital that buﬀer the South from the impacts on production eﬃciency (see
Figure 9.c).
However, the additional remittance receipts, which have a dynamic eﬀect
to raise residents’ assets via saving, act to improve the welfare of those left
behind. The importance of the role played by remittances can be gauged in
Figure 9.d. It is observed that, in relation to the simulation with the usual
calibration, all regions are adversely aﬀected in the alternative scenario where
the skilled have lower propensity to remit, although some suﬀer more and
others less. Take the period 2060 for example. MEN and SSA are the hardest
hit regions because they receive relatively large amounts of remittances with
respect to their GDP (see Table 1). While MEN sees the positive impact on
its GNI per capita dwindled from 0.6% to 0.4%, SSA has the total impact
changed from -0.1% to -0.3%.
3.4. Total impacts on skilled-to-less-skilled income inequality
Since brain drain does not only impact the overall economic outcome but
also entails distributional eﬀects, it is important to study how the skilled-to-
less-skilled income inequality is aﬀected by the migration shocks. Figure 10.a
27depicts the total impacts with the usual calibration, while Figures 10.c to d
present the results under the alternative simulations as described before.
Consistent with the model where skilled and less-skilled labor are imper-
fect substitutes (see Eq. (8)), it is found that the total impacts on inequality
are dictated by the human capital channel: income inequality decreases (by
0.6-1.8% in 2060) due to the declined skill wage premiums resulted from a
positive change in resident human capital, and vice versa. This is speciﬁcally
conﬁrmed in the alternative scenario that lacks the incentive eﬀect on human
capital formation: in Figure 10.b, all developing regions experience rising
income inequality (by 0.2-1.0% in 2060) due to larger skill outﬂows, which
is in contrary to all other scenarios where “brain gain” eventually leads to
a smaller income gap between skill types. Moreover, since regions with high
skilled emigration rates (e.g., EAS, LAC, and SSA) are less likely to beneﬁt
from brain gain at least in the short-run, they are also the regions witnessing
short-run rises in income inequality when the incentive eﬀect is present.
4. Conclusion
Many concerns as well as hopes have been raised over the issue of brain
drain, in particular skill outﬂows from the developing South to the developed
North. On the one hand, the direct impact of losing skilled human capital
and its potentially negative externality may do harms to domestic production
and adversely aﬀect those left behind in the developing economies. On the
other hand, recent empirical studies have demonstrated a series of positive
feedback eﬀects, suggesting that skilled emigration may inspire more human
capital formation and that, on top of remittances, emigrants may contribute
to the home economy through diaspora externalities.
The novelty of this paper is to construct a uniﬁed generic framework that
is capable of combining many direct impacts of brain drain; moreover, their
interactions and other indirect eﬀects are also endogenously and dynamically
generated. In this fashion, the framework is able to assess the global eﬀects
of brain drain on developing economies and to quantify the relative sizes of
various static and dynamic impacts. Furthermore, it allows us to incorporate
many essential channels, such as age structure and capital ﬂows, through
which brain drain may impact the developing economies in a direct and/or an
indirect manner, whereas they are usually not studied in a less comprehensive
partial equilibrium setting.
28It is identiﬁed that the short-run impact of brain drain on resident human
capital is extremely crucial, since it does not only determine the number of
skilled workers available to domestic production, but it also aﬀects an econ-
omy’s capacity to innovate or to adopt modern technologies, which acts to
determine the production eﬃciency and greatly inﬂuence the volume of cap-
ital in- and out-ﬂows. Therefore, it follows that, when the incentive eﬀect on
human capital formation is absent, economies in all the sending regions be-
come very much worse oﬀ (see Figure 11.a). Moreover, the impacts working
through the technology channel on production eﬃciencies are magniﬁed in
the open economy where capital investments conform to international arbi-
trage. Thus, when ﬂows of physical capital are restricted, it is observed that
those regions experiencing positive impacts on GDP per capita now enjoy
more limited beneﬁts, whereas the regions suﬀering from slowdowns in tech-
nological progress are more insulated from foreign capital retreat and native
capital ﬂight (see Figure 11.b).
Moreover, although not all remittance receipts are invested in the do-
mestic production, the extra income received from migrants abroad is non-
negligible in improving the welfare of those left behind. Consequently, if
skilled migrants have a lower propensity to remit than their less-skilled coun-
terpart as concluded by some empirical studies, the beneﬁcial eﬀect of brain
drain through remittances on GNI per capita will then be reduced (see Fig-
ure 11.c), and the impact scales of brain drain on income in the South will be
mainly determined by its impacts on GDP per capita. Regarding the impacts
of brain drain on the skilled-to-less-skilled income inequality, it is dictated by
the skill composition of resident human capital; as a result, whether a region
enjoys “brain gain” also implies whether its income inequality is decreased
or not. Without the presence of the incentive eﬀect on human capital forma-
tion, every region will witness an enlarging income gap between skilled and
less-skilled workers (see Figure 11.d).
As mentioned in Section 2.3, our aggregate regional approach implies that
the simulated results are more indicative of those experienced by large coun-
tries. Despite this disadvantage, the aggregate results still provide signiﬁcant
implications also on the per country basis. Given the importance of how brain
drain impacts resident human capital in the short-run and its ensuing dy-
namic eﬀects on technological progress, it can be concluded that countries
with high skilled emigration rates are the most vulnerable to increased skilled
emigration, as Beine et al. (2008a) provides evidence that they are the least
likely to beneﬁt from “brain gain” out of brain drain. They are composed of
29a long list of developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, Central
America, and also many small states. Moreover, although international cap-
ital mobility rewards the developing economies with enhanced technological
progress, it also magniﬁes the harms done by brain drain to other sending
economies by discouraging capital investments away from the negatively im-
pacted regions in terms of technology.
Hence, is brain drain a curse or a boon? There is not a uniform an-
swer, and it varies with the sending country’s characteristics. For example,
in Eastern European countries, brain drain does not only negatively aﬀects
its short-run huamn capital, but it also signiﬁcantly increases the burden
of their working-age residents to support the relatively large share of re-
tirees. Besides, for the technologically less-advanced countries where skilled
emigration is not a prevalent phenomenon, brain drain may not be an un-
welcome event not only because it has the potential to raise resident human
capital, but also because their skilled diaspora may facilitate the diﬀusion
of up-to-date technologies, which accelerates technological progress in these
economies. However, the certain losers of brain drain are those countries that
have already experienced large outﬂows of their skilled, and their loss is not
alleviated but magniﬁed as it takes place in a globalized world where skill
outﬂows generate inﬂuences also upon other ﬂows of factors, most notably
physical capital.
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